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Abstract 
During the middle period (8
th -15
th century) literati began to discuss Zhong guo as 
both historical place and as culture. Although such writing made a clear 
distinction between Zhong guo as the central and superior spatiocultural entity 
and the surrounding peoples and states (the Yi di), these writers were also opposed 
to an expansionist foreign policy that tried to incorporate outsiders into the empire. 
In contrast foreign conquerors typically avoided the discourse of Zhong guo and 
instead used ethnicity as basis for defining membership in their empires. Although 
this was a means legislating privileges for the conquering minority it also 
removed the limits on imperial expansion that were inherent in the discourse of 
the Zhong guo.  
 
ί ڐࣛ̚ಂɞЇɤʞ˰ߏdɻɛක֐ਗ਼ʕ਷Νࣛൖމዝ̦ή
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ᅰּ؂٫הԮϞʘतᛆΥجʷٙ˙جd್Ͼ̴ɰ୅ৰəʫί׵ʕ਷ሞࠑ
ʕ࿁܎਷ᓒੵٙࠢՓf 
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This paper takes up the cultural interpretation of mobility from a spatial perspective. 
Just as we can view social mobility as crossing limits that otherwise constrain the scope 
of a person’s or a class’s work and aspirations, we can view spatial mobility as crossing 
boundaries in space that are constructed to define where a person, or even a country, 
belongs. A foreign conquest is an example of spatial mobility. 
Mobility, whether social or spatial, requires the existence of boundaries and limits, 
for without them mobility would be a meaningless term. The most concrete manifestation 
of the idea of boundaries are spatial borders, whether between prefectures or countries. In 
contrast to social boundaries, which we easily see as being culturally constructed, 
political borders appear to be closer to physical objects in that they can be described and 
delineated and easily accepted as real. Yet in practice spatial borders, whether they are 
human constructs or physical objects, are not constant over space and time. And because 
they are not constant they must be justified, maintained, and interpreted.  
This paper looks at the cultural interpretation of the spatial boundaries of that entity 
which is essential to any discussion of Chinese history: China itself. It does so from two 
perspectives: those who defined and defended the borders of that place and those who 
crossed those borders and redrew them. It asks how this was done, what meaning was 
attached to being inside them or outside them, and what different approaches were meant 
to accomplish. This inquiry is focused on the middle period—from the start of Tang’s 
decline in the mid-eighth century to the consolidation of Ming rule in the early 
fifteenth—a period of unprecedented border crossing and boundary redefinition, and it 
considers the views of both Chinese literati and foreign conquerors.  
I pursue this in the first instance through an examination of literati definitions of a 
transdynastic spatiocultural entity during the middle period, and their use of the term 
Zhong guo ʕ਷ for that entity. The ideological use of the term seems to have been most 
frequent in thinking about relations with the states and peoples beyond the borders, an 
issue of particular concern during this period. The term Zhong guo was a vehicle for both 
a spatial claim—that there was spatial area that had a continuous history going back to 
the “central states” (the zhong guo) of the central plain during the Eastern Zhou)—and a 
cultural claim—that there was a continuous culture that had emerged in that place which 
its inhabitant ought to, but might not, continue. I translate Zhong guo as “the Central 
Country.” 
In brief I argue that spatially and culturally literati always deployed the term Zhong 
guo in relationship to a wider world to establish an opposition between the Zhong guo 
and those outside of it, who were typically referred as the Yi di ζӭ. This pairing was 
asymmetrical. The Zhong guo referred to a state formation and Yi di named the entities 
outside of it as tribes, thus making a cultural distinction between those who had a state 
and those who lived in a lesser order of sociopolitical organization. This was purposeful, 
for all speakers were fully aware that many of those they grouped as Yi di had states of 
their own, that in fact the known world had a great number of states, and the language of 
diplomacy recognized this with its reference to “ambassadors of external states” (̮਷
Դ).
1 The use of the Zhong guo was also a spatial definition. It asserted that this guo was 
                                                 
I thank the participants at the International Conference on Cultural Interpretations of Mobility, particularly 
Profs. Wang Deyi and Deng Xiaonan, for their comments. Another version of this essay was presented at 
the International Conference on Translocal and Transregional Dynamics in Chinese History, 960-1911, at 
the National University of Singapore, May 2008; I thank Profs. Ong Chang Woei and Koh Khee Heong.   3 
central relative to all others (a quality that requires assuming that there were many guo 
under heaven), thus defining all others as peripheral. This asymmetry helps explain why 
outsiders were at best ambivalent about adopting the term Zhong guo in a cultural sense, 
for by doing so they were locating themselves as Yi di. The issue came to a head when 
outsiders became insiders, when those who had been called Yi di gained sway over part or 
all of the territory associated with the Zhong guo. One strategy that they adopted—such 
as the Mongols’ use of tribal terms to distinguish between all the peoples under their 
sway and to legislate differentiated privileges for these population groups—was perhaps 
conducive to a certain kind of ethnic nationalism.
2  
In translating the Zhong guo as “the Central Country” I have rejected its common 
translation as “the Middle Kingdom.” It seems to me that those who used “the Central 
Country” were not focusing on political authority but on the cultural qualities of the one 
country that was at the center. I use the term “country,” reserving “state,” the common 
translation of the term guo, for dynastic states and government activities. Middle-period 
writers were interested in the possibility of a transdynastic spatiocultural entity, a country 
rather than a dynastic empire or a modern nation-state. 
 
The Zhong guo and Zhongguo/China 
Before proceeding we need to make a distinction. A reader of middle-period texts 
who encounters the two characters zhong guo is likely to translate the term as “China” 
because today the internal name of the country that is known in English as China is 
Zhongguo. Today China is a nation-state that claims a history that includes many 
different dynastic states, population groups (or ethnic groups ͏ૄ), and cultural 
traditions. A leading contemporary historian of China points out that “The concept of 
‘national history’ in its current Western usage was wholly unfamiliar to Chinese 
historians before the 20
th century.”
3 The spatiotemporal term we use, “China,” originates 
in the Sanskrit cīna but enters into Latinate languages rather late, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, from the Persian toponym Chīnī. Europe of the middle ages used 
the term Cathay, which came through Inner Asia and stems from “Khitan,” the name of 
the people who created the Great Liao State (907-1125).
4 Whatever the name, outsiders 
were referring to a place that they believed had an existence over time. 
                                                                                                                                                
1 Tuotuo ୭୭, ed., Song shi ҂̦, Scripta Sinica ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 5.96, 50.996, 
50.1006, 114.2719, etc. 
2 For reasons that will be made clear, this does not lead me to support the view of China as a multi-ethnic 
state such as argued in Wang Ke ˮݚ, Min zu yu guo jia - Zhongguo duo min zu tong yi guo jia si xiang de 
xi pu ͏ૄ ᝺ 国࢕ : ʕ国ε͏ૄ统ɓ国࢕ܠซٙӻ谱  (Beijing: Zhongguo she ke, 2001). 
3 Yu Yingshi, "Changing Conceptions of National History in Twentieth Century China," in Conceptions of 
National History. Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 78, , ed. Erik Lönrith, Karl Molin, and Ragnar Björk 
(Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1994). Cited in Achim Mittag, "The Early Modern Formation of a 
National Identity in Chinese Historical Thought -- Random Notes on Ming and Early-Qing Historiography" 
(paper presented at the Chinese and Comparative Historical Thinking in the 21st Century, Fudan University, 
Shanghai, 2004). 
4 On various external names for “China” see Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Chinese history : a manual, Rev. 
and enl. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), 132, 750-3. For a detailed review 
of external naming see Hu Axiang ߡڛୂ, Wei zai si ming : "Zhongguo" gujin chengwei yanjiu 伟۔౶Τ : 
"ʕ囯"̚ʦ称谓硏Ӻ (Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000), 329-79.   4 
When we ask what the inhabitants at the end of the nineteenth century called that 
place, however, the term that came to mind was the dynastic entity, the Great Qing State, 
ɽ૶਷, which was not equivalent to “China” as Westerners at the time used that term, 
yet in the twentieth century “China/Zhongguo” has become an officially mandated term 
for this country as a continuous historical entity from antiquity to the present. The 
argument, which I take from Lydia Liu, goes roughly like this: at the end of the 
nineteenth century some leading intellectuals, having seen that modern Western nation-
states referred to their country by names such as France and England, despite changes in 
political power, argued that their own country needed a name as well, something that 
recognized its historical continuity without privileging one dynasty. Ultimately, over the 
objections of some, the ancient term zhong guo was adopted and entered into the new 
nationalist education program (over alternatives such as zhong hua ʕശ and hua xia ശ
ࢀ). But this modern term, which I shall transcribe as Zhongguo, was deployed in new 
ways, as the equivalent of the Western term “China.” In other words the use of “China” 
and “Chinese” began as a Western usage; they were then adopted by the government of 
the people the West called “the Chinese” to identify their own country, its culture, 
language, and population. This took place in the context of establishing the equality of 
this country in international relations and creating a Western-style nation-state, a “China” 
to which the “Chinese” could be loyal.
5 In using Zhongguo/China to refer to its history, 
the People’s Republic of China in fact recognizes that its population is composed of 
different peoples. They are all officially “Chinese” but it still distinguishes among 
peoples with different heritages and languages. Thus the majority population is said to be 
people of the “Han ethnicity” who speak the “Han language.” At least officially there is 
no such thing as the “Chinese” language, although in informal practice the term 
“Chinese” pertains to the “Han ethnicity.” 
China today uses a term that in the ancient Eastern Zhou period referred to the central 
(zhong) states (guo) of the central plain (zhong yuan ʕࡡ) to name a country that asserts 
its inclusion of the pastoral and aboriginal peoples, lands, and histories that were outside 
of the “central states” in Eastern Zhou. I can see nothing to object to in this. The referents 
of the name changed over time; no one period has ultimate authority over its meaning.
6 
However, when we read this modern Zhongguo/China back onto past texts and past 
minds, so that every occurrence of the term zhong guo appears to us to be the same as 
                                                 
5 Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 75-81, 264-5. Liu notes that at least one official from the “Great State of 
Qing” (the official name for the polity from 1644 to 1911) found the Western use of “China” and 
“Chinese” insulting for its refusal to acknowledge in words the political status of his country.  
6 This point is made with great clarity by Tan Qixiang 谭Չ㔬, "Lishi shang de Zhongguo he Zhongguo 
lidai jiangyu ዝ̦ɪٙʕ਷ձʕ਷ዝ˾ᖛਹ," Zhongguo bianjiang shi yanjiu ʕ਷ᗙᖛ̦ή޼Ӻ 8, no. 1 
(1991). For Tan the adoption of Zhongguo as an inclusive term fit the general trend of history in which 
once excluded peoples came to be part of China. In contrast, Fei Xiaotong and Chen Liankai took the view 
that this conception Zhongguo/China was taking form over history; see Fei Xiaotong ൬ѽஷ, ed., 
Zhonghua minzu duoyuan y ti geju ʕ华͏ૄεʩɓᠧࣸ҅, Revised by Chen Liankai ௓ஹක ed. (Beijing: 
Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 1999), 169-89, 211-44. Tsutsumi argues that the idea of combining 
the foreign and native into one state only emerges in Yuan and is adopted in early Ming; Tsustumi Kazuaki 
చɓ݇, "Chūgoku no jigazō -- sono jikan to kūkan o kitei suru monoʕ਷㗮І೥྅--㗝㗮ࣛග㗨٤ග㘒
஝֛㗙㘋㘂㗮," in Gendai Chūgoku chiiki kenkyū no aratana shiken ତ˾ʕ国ήਹ޼Ӻ㗮อ㗟㗪ൖ圏, 
ed. Nishimura Shigeo ГӀϓඪ (Kyōto ԯே: Sekai Shisōsha ˰ޢܠซٟ, 2007), 39-49.   5 
“China,” we may be wrongly imputing a particular national historical consciousness to 
the past. For reasons that will be discussed below, the use of terms such as “Hua,” Hua-
xia” and “Zhong guo” to refer to a transdynastic entity was not the same thing as the 
modern use of China/Zhongguo as a counterpart to “England” or “France.” Like Ge 
Zhaoguang, I think the use of the term Zhong guo during the middle period came to 
encapsulate a particular kind of national historical consciousness, one that was not the 
same as the modern term “China” yet was different from what had gone before.
7 
 
Comprehending Historical Space and Time 
A striking feature of middle-period intellectual culture was its interest in envisioning 
continuity through space and time, even if it lacked the equivalent of a transdynastic 
country name such as “China.” We find this in well-known historical works. The best 
example is the series of works that had “continuity/comprehensiveness” (ஷ) in their title: 
Du You’s Comprehensive Canons ஷՊfrom the late eighth century; Sima Guang’s 
(1019-1086) Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government ༟طஷᛡ, which created a 
single 1400 year chronology that included all dynastic states without defining any one as 
more legitimate than others; Zheng Qiao’s Comprehensive Treatises ஷқfrom the mid-
twelfth century; and Ma Duanlin’s Comprehensive Examination of the Written Record ˖
ᘠஷϽfrom the early fourteenth century.
8 These attempts to create single frameworks for 
the understanding of the past were, I think, one possible response to the fundamental 
reordering of the connections between wealth, power, status, and culture that was taking 
place. 
Even more striking was the attempt to make geographical visualizations and 
compilations serve the purpose of transdynastic continuity, for a geographic perspective 
is by its nature better suited to capturing variation through space at a particular moment 
than to relating change over time. The “Map of the Traces of Yu” ߃ ༦ ྡ, engraved in 
1136, sought to relate the present to the description of the geographic whole found in the 
“Tributes of Yu” ߃্section of the Book of Documents. In that text the Great Yu moved 
through the terrain, distinguishing regions, recognizing distinctive qualities, and, above 
all, rechanneling the water system so as to bring all regions into a single system, without 
erasing their distinctiveness. The “Map of the Traces of Yu” is grid map scaled at 100 li 
(ca. 30 miles) to the square (about a 1:4.5 million scale). It aims at accuracy in depicting 
the coastline, rivers, lakes and mountains, with the depicted river system being an attempt 
to capture the uncertain account of the rivers in the ancient text. At the same time it 
                                                 
7 Ge Zhaoguang ໤ΊΈ, "Songdai "Zhongguo" yishi de tuxian -- guanyu jinshi minsuzhuyi sixiang de yige 
yuanyuan ҂˾“ʕ਷”จᗆٙ̉ᜑ--ᗫɲڐ˰͏ૄ˴່ܠซٙɓࡈჃ๕," Wen shi zhe ˖̦ࡪ(Qinghua 
University), no. 1 (2004). Ge argues that the rise of foreign states in the north during the course of the 
Tang-Song transition led to a new national self-consciousness, in which spatial and cultural boundaries 
came to be more sharply drawn than before, and a concern over political legitimacy (͍୕) and moral 
authority (༸୕ 
8 Du You ӁС, Tong dian ஷՊ, Scripta Sinica (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988), Ma Duanlin ৵၌ᑗ, Wen 
xian tong kao ˖ᘠஷϽ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), Zheng Qiao ቍዙ, Tong zhi ஷқ (Hangzhou: 
Zhejiang shuju, 1896). Sima Guang ̡৵Έ, Zizhi tongjian ༟طஷᛠ (Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1956), 
69.2185-88. Although he reasserted the idea of legitimate dynasties, Zhu Xi’s redaction of Sima’s history 
adopted his chronological approach.   6 
locates the modern Song capitals and prefectures by on the physical landscape. It does 
not include the Great Wall and although the map covers parts of Liao, Xia, and Dali, it 
does not mark their administrative units (with the exception of the sixteen prefectures 
disputed with Liao). It draws no boundaries—but it is unclear whether it is avoiding the 
subject or reflecting the court’s aggressive push at the borders. It is bereft of any text and 
depends on the viewer’s ability to intuitively grasp it as a spatial proposition about and 
representation of Song relative to the earliest known account of the world. It is far more 
accurate than other known contemporary maps.
9 It belongs to a tradition of spatially 
accurate national map-making, dating back to the Pei Xiu (224-271), but the point of the 
map is not spatial accuracy but a historical claim: the present world is continuous with 
antiquity.  
A different approach, but one that supports the continuity of the present with the past, 
is evident in the commercially printed Handy Maps of Geography Through the Ages ዝ
˾ήଣܸ౛ྡ from the twelfth century. This atlas creates historical continuity through 
its depiction of political and administrative features with forty-four maps and 
accompanying texts, from antiquity through the Northern Song. It begins with a general 
map of “Territories of the Hua ശ and the Yi ζ in Past and Present” that identifies Song 
administrative units and foreign states and a second general map (now leaving out the 
Korean peninsula), “Names of Mountains and Rivers of the Hua and Yi Through the 
Ages,” which also names Song administrative units. The maps are based on a common 
template that includes the Great Wall and Northern Song prefectures; they cover mainly 
what we would today call “China proper.” Because the maps label the Northern Song 
prefectures the viewer can look at any past period and locate contemporary prefectures 
within the administrative structure of the past.
10  
A contemporary work does the same thing without recourse to maps. The Extensive 
Record of the Realmᒑήᄿা is a privately compiled historical gazetteer in two parts. 
The first lists the upper administrative hierarchy in past periods (Tribute of Yu, Shun, 
seven Warring States, Qin, Han, Three Kingdoms, Jin, Tang, Tang military governors, 
and the Five dynasties), but lists within each the Northern Song prefectures. The second 
part details the Song administrative hierarchy, down to the county ጤlevel, and gives the 
administrative history of each (i.e. its founding and changes over time).
11 The preface 
suggests that this is not only a reference work, readers should see from it that there is 
spatial continuity between the present and antiquity, and this conclusion apparently is 
meant to support the compiler’s stated opposition to the court’s efforts to expand Song 
territory, a point to which I shall return later.
12 Both works, one mainly cartographic and 
the other much like a database, construct for the reader a larger entity that is continuous 
over time, one by focusing on physical geography and the other on administrative 
geography.  
                                                 
9 Cao Wanru ૎ੈν and et al., eds., Zhongguo gudai ditu ji ʕ਷̚˾ήྡණ, 3 vols. (Beijing: Wenwu 
chubanshe, 1990-94), vol 2, pl. 54-56. 
10 Shui Anli ೼τᓿ, Lidai dili zhizhang tu ዝ˾ήଣܸ౛ྡ (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, rpt. 
1989). 
11 Ouyang Min ᆄජ᥺, Yu di guang ji ᒑήᄿা, ed. Li Yongxian ҽۇ΋ and Wang Xiaohong ˮʃߎ 
(Chengdu Sichuan daxue chubanshe 2003). 
12 Ibid., 1247.   7 
Although not one of these three works names the larger entity they are depicting, the 
Handy Atlas makes clear that the subject is the land of the Hua ശin its first two maps but 
almost never uses the term Zhong guo (in one case it means the north and in another both 
north and south).
13 However, taken together, these works show how much middle period 
views had departed from what Mark Lewis sees in early China when, he tells us, 
“Universality was asserted as a privilege of the ruler and his agents, while ordinary 
people remained locked in the limited realms defined by their households, their village, 
or their region. This contrast justified the former’s power and the latter’s impotence.”
14 
The Handy Atlas was a commercial product and its contents fed other commercial 
compilations such as the Extensive Record of the Forest of Affairs (ԫ؍ᄿা), the most 
popular household encyclopedia of the late thirteenth and fourteenth century. There was 
enough historical geographic information available to scholars through the market that in 
the 1180s Ni Pu ࡎ Ϡ, a local scholar in Pujiang ऌϪ, Wuzhou ⃳ψ, had the means to 
draw an eight-foot square map showing changes in the northern border throughout 
history.
15 
These historical compendia, maps, and gazetteers relate the historical succession of 
dynastic states to a larger sense of spatiotemporal continuity. There was a long tradition 
of treating a succession of dynastic states as the line of continuity connecting the present 
to antiquity. Each dynastic state had its own name, administrative system, and territorial 
claims. Thus the Great Song State (980-1279) succeeded the last of the five short-lived 
dynasties of the north that followed the demise of the Great Tang State (618-907), and 
legitimated its claim by having the last emperor of its predecessor formally abdicate the 
throne. Had there been only one dynastic state at any one moment, abdication ceremonies 
might have been enough, but during some periods multiple dynastic states coexisted. 
Since Ban Gu’s History of the Han, which had argued that the Liu family was 
biologically connected to the sage kings, and thus represented the “correct continuity” 
(͍୕) with antiquity, some had tried to make sense out of political change and 
fragmentation by supposing a single line of succession of “legitimate” dynasties, through 
a combination of abdication ceremonies and assertions that natural portents had signaled 
heaven’s reassignment of the mandate to rule. The last great debate over this sort of 
legitimate succession took place in the Great Jin State (1115-1234) of the Jurchens, who 
had taken the northern plain from the Great Song State.
16 It has been argued that the 
decision during the Yuan to compile dynastic histories of Liao, Song, and Jin changed the 
situation by treating conquest dynasties as equally legitimate.
17  
Dynastic states created a history with a high degree of definition. Dynastic states were 
finite in time, they had starting points and end points and they were, at any given moment, 
boundaried space. Dynastic states organized their territory, at first through a feudal 
                                                 
13 Shui Anli ೼τᓿ, Lidai dili zhizhang tu ዝ˾ήଣܸ౛ྡ, 101, 8. 
14 Mark Edward Lewis, The construction of space in early China (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New 
York Press, 2006), 195. 
15 Wu Shidao юࢪ༸, Jing xiang lu หඊ፽, Xu Jin hua cong shu (Yongkang: Yongkang Hu shi Meng 
xuan lou ͑ੰߡˤྫྷ፯ᅽ, 1924), 6.10a-11a   
16 This is analyzed in Hok Lam Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions Under The Jurchen 
Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984). 
17 Tsustumi Kazuaki చɓ݇, "Chūgoku no jigazō -- sono jikan to kūkan o kitei suru monoʕ਷㗮І೥྅--
㗝㗮ࣛග㗨٤ග㘒஝֛㗙㘋㘂㗮."   8 
system of power sharing or, beginning with the Qin unification of 221 BC, through a 
centralized, hierarchical administrative system of commanderies (or prefectures) and 
counties (or subprefectures). The capital(s) where the court and ruler resided defined the 
center(s) of a dynastic state. Its laws and rituals defined ranks, privileges and duties. And 
the logic of hereditary succession provided for the perpetuation of authority during the 
lifetime of the dynastic state. In all these ways dynastic states defined space and time and 
social position, making it possible to locate any person or locality with reference to the 
state.  
 The “comprehensive” works discussed above were transdynastic: they did not deny 
dynasties as building blocks of historical time and space but they supplied ways of 
thinking about the larger entity that states, localities, and individuals were part of. They 
were about something more than the traditional discourse of the dynastic state. But why 
not make Zhong guo the term for this entity? The answer, to adumbrate the discussion 
that follows, is that Zhong guo as “the Central Country” served a different purpose. It 
posited an entity that existed in a particular kind of relationship to a larger world, one that 
had indefinite boundaries, that existed over time without having a definite temporal span, 
and that had no single place as its center. Dynastic states were historical facts, but the 
Central Country was an ideological construct that claimed history. Belonging to the 
Central County was a matter of cultural participation rather than administrative 
subordination. Dynastic states did not define the Central Country, but they could claim to 
be it. 
 
Central Country Discourse in the Middle Period 
In earlier usage zhong guo was a spatial term with cultural meaning that referred to 
the “central states” area of Eastern Zhou, which was constituted by the states that shared 
the Zhou rituals and surrounded by peoples who did not.
18 The middle period literati who 
drew on this tradition were living at a time when the use of the “central states” to refer 
exclusively to the central plain region was being challenged on two fronts: by the 
growing economic, cultural, and political importance of the south and the state building 
of the northern peoples—the Khitans, Jurchens, and Mongols—who occupied first part 
and then all of the central plain of the north and finally took the south as well. 
The term Zhong guo appears in discussions of relations with the larger world. Usually 
the writer speaks from a position “inside” (ʫ) the Central Country about its relations 
                                                 
18 The best systematic account of the early development of the term zhong guo is Hu Axiang ߡڛୂ, Wei 
zai si ming : "Zhongguo" gujin chengwei yanjiu 伟۔౶Τ : "ʕ囯"̚ʦ称谓硏Ӻ, 243-80. Hu shows that 
zhong, “central,” is the value and that the use of zhong guo to refer to the states of the central plain is 
relatively late; and it is at that point that it came to be used as a term of cultural belonging (253-64). He 
notes too that this allowed for greater inclusion so that states on the northeastern, northwestern, and 
southern periphery of the central plain came be included at certain points (261-4). Hu’s conclusions about 
changes after Qin and Han are generally asserted without textual support. In brief he wants to argue that all 
the territory of any imperial state was treated as the Zhong guo, although he notes that the examples of it 
meaning the central plain are very numerous, and that this was the case for both the northern conquest 
dynasties of the period of division and the middle period dynastic states, whom he thinks recognized each 
other as parts of the Zhong guo (267-73). A search of the term in the Bei shi and Nan shi (Scripta Sinica 
editions) suggests, however, that when zhong guo was used in the north in a cultural sense it referred to the 
conquered natives and that when it was used in the south it was used in the context of making a distinction 
with various foreign tribal peoples. The middle period case will be examined below. Hu’s arguments for 
the imperial period would appear to be constrained by official policy on a sensitive subject.    9 
with what is “outside” (̮), where the outside is constituted by the other countries and 
different peoples. Those outside, both pastoral tribal formations and sedentary 
bureaucratic states, were typically referred to collectively as Yi or Yi di ζӭ. Although 
middle period writers understood Yi di in different ways, ranging from primitives, to 
barbarians, to foreigners, this was generally a pejorative term—thus the common 
translation of “barbarians”—and not accepted by the peoples against whom it was used.
19 
We shall see that the term Zhong guo figures in debates that involve views of foreigners, 
foreign relations, and frontiers. 
As middle period writers deployed it, the term Zhong guo was both an historically 
defined place—the “central states” of the feudal lords loyal to the Easter Zhou in the 
central plain—and a cultural space, where a body of practices had accumulated that 
constituted a certain civilization. To avoid confusion this essay treats these two aspects of 
the Zhong guo as “space” and as “culture.” Space and culture were analytically separate 
but mutually dependent. The danger was that one could be taken without the other. If the 
Central Country was only defined by culture then wherever the culture existed defined 
the space where it belonged—in other words, it was not necessary to hold the central 
plain to claim to be the Central Country; if it was only defined by an historically given 
space such as the central plain of the north, then the occupiers of that space defined the 
culture of the Central Country. We shall see that writers wanted keep a linkage between 
the culture of the Central Country and its historical space, even when in Southern Song 
the central plain, the historical center of Eastern Zhou, was lost. The southern statecraft 
writer Chen Liang used both spatial and cultural perspectives in making arguments for 
the recovery of the northern central plain. In letters to the Song emperor in 1178 and 
1188 he treats the spatial Zhong guo as the “central states” area of Eastern Zhou: “How 
could heaven make the south limit itself to being beyond this one river [the Yangzi] and 
not have it be one with the Zhong guo.” ˂৉Դی˙Іࠢ׵ɓϪʘڌ,ϾʔԴၾʕ਷ஷ
Ͼމɓࣴ.
20 Chen grants that the historical culture of the Zhong guo could continue 
outside its original historical space, but he contends that without recovering that space 
Song would ultimately lose authority. Chen has two arguments for why the north must be 
recovered. First, to the emperor:  
Your subject holds that the Zhong guo is the correct qi of heaven-and-
earth. It is where heaven’s mandate is planted. It is where the mind of 
humanity converges. It is where [official] robes and caps, rites and music 
collect. It is that by which a hundred generations of emperors and kings 
have continued in succession. How could this be violated by the perverse 
qi of the Yi di from outside of heaven-and-earth. Unfortunately they were 
able to violate it, with the result that the robes and caps, rites and music of 
the zhong guo have been taken and lodged on the periphery. Heaven’s 
mandate and the mind of humanity still have something they are tied to. 
                                                 
19 This is evident not only in official Liao, Jin, and Yuan usage but also in the later altering of many of the 
passages quoted in this essay by the Qing Siku quanshu editors, who replaced term Yi di with wai yi ̮໼ 
and made other changes. The extent of this kind of editorial work is fully visible in the Scripta Sinica 
edition of the San chao bei meng hui bian.  
20 Chen Liang ௓ڥ, Chen Liang ji ௓ڥණ, ed. Deng Guangming, Supplemented edition. ed. (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1987), 1.17, Letter to Emperor Xiaozong of 1188.   10 
But how can on this account we be secure over the long term and free of 
trouble?
21 
Ѕ᛿ઓfʕ਷˂ήʘ͍ंɰf˂նʘהᒤɰfɛːʘה  ɰfВڿ
ᓿᆀʘהയɰfϵ˾܎ˮʘה˸޴וɰf৉˂ήʘ̮ζӭԝंʘה̙
ι۔fʔֱϾঐιʘf Їɲࣄʕ਷ВڿᓿᆀϾభʘ਋˙f˂նɛː
೓Ϟהᖩf್৉˸݊މ̙ɮτϾೌԫɰf 
Chen continues that for the south to seek peace and no longer aspire to recovering the 
Zhong guo is analogous to putting all one’s energy into one of the four limbs and letting 
the others atrophy; just as such a body cannot be sustained and neither can Song. He then 
turns back to the history of the northern and southern dynasties. The southeast may have 
had a cultural claim but once the foreign Tabgatch occupied in the north and, under 
Emperor Xiaowen (r. 471-99) of the Northern Wei, 
fixed Luoyang at the capital and cultivated the robes and caps, rites and 
music of the Zhong guo then the old robes and caps, rites and music to the 
east of the Yangzi were no longer that to which heaven’s mandate and the 
mind of humanity was tied. Thus those who unify all under heaven in the 
end are in the northwest, they are not in the southeast.
22 
ʩᕧৎϾוʘfѽ˖༹֛ேݾජf˸ࡌʕ਷ʘВڿᓿᆀfϾϪ̸Вڿ
ᓿᆀʘᔚfڢూ˂նɛːʘהᖩӶf݊˸ɓ˂ɨ٫f՗ίГ̏Ͼʔί
؇یf 
In short, the Song dynasty in the south has the culture but not the space. If those 
who occupy the central plain adopt the culture of the Zhong guo as well, then they 
will be legitimate and Song will lose its claim to be the rightful ruler of all under 
heaven. This argument depends upon the assumption that there is a culture there 
and that it can be acquired; Chen is not claiming that foreign peoples can replace 
what is there with their own culture and still be legitimate.  
This leads to Chen’s second argument, aimed at his literati audience. If those 
foreigners who hold the historical place Zhong guo impose their own culture on it then 
the inhabitants of the place will lose all that the historical culture of the Zhong guo was 
created to do for them—something that Southern Song literati traveling to the north 
reported was happening.
23 In this case he opposes cultural assimilation and calls for 
recovering the north in order to save the culture: 
The sages defended the Zhong guo with canons and limited the Yi di 
with borders, thus to make clear that they were not to mix. However, the 
mandate resides with the populace, and [in that regard] it was not 
appropriate to make a distinction between Yi di and Zhong guo. Thus the 
idea of caring for both arose and the principle of peace on both sides 
gained currency. It got to the point that [our past dynasties] wanted to 
marry daughters to them, counting on the goodwill of kinship to secure a 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 1.1, First letter to Emperor Xiaozong. Discussed in Hoyt C. Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism: 
Ch'en Liang's Challenge to Chu Hsi (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 
1982), 102-3. 
22 Chen Liang ௓ڥ, Chen Liang ji ௓ڥණ, 1.2. 
23 Ge Zhaoguang ໤ΊΈ, "Songdai "Zhongguo" yishi de tuxian -- guanyu jinshi minsuzhuyi sixiang de 
yige yuanyuan ҂˾“ʕ਷”จᗆٙ̉ᜑ--ᗫɲڐ˰͏ૄ˴່ܠซٙɓࡈჃ๕," 11.   11 
day of peace. It is because they are not practiced in ritual and 
righteousness that they are called Yi di. Can we then use the norms of 
human relations to rein them in?
24 
໋ɛ˸੬Պ衞ʕ਷f˸܆ᖛࠢζӭf׼Չʔ̙ਞɰf್͏նʘה
ίfʔ຅˸ζӭʕ਷މ别f݂ࡒฌʘႭጳfϾஷձʘ່Бfޟ٫Ї૧
˸ɾֈʘf኏˸໙ೣʘࢸϾᐏɓ˚ʘτf־ઓʔ୦׵ᓿ່ɰf݂ፗʘ
ζӭfϾ̙˸ɛࡐϾⷻʘ˷f 
Chen then provides an answer to his question: 
If there is the Zhong guo there must be the Yi di. The constant way of 
handling the Yi di was most developed in Zhou and its transformation [i.e. 
its corruption] is recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals.  
Ϟʕ਷̀Ϟζӭfܙζӭʘ੬༸୽༉׵մfϾՉᜊۆ௪׵݆߇Ӷf 
The Zhou solution was separation, but as Zhou declined:  
The Zhong guo and Yi di were mixed together and became one. After that 
[the southern state of] Chu first usurped [the title of] king and, using the 
ways of the Yi di, acted up in Zhong guo. Wu and Yue rose from the south 
and competed with Jin and Chu for hegemony…  
Today the central plain has already changed into Yi di. If we understand 
the ways of the Zhong guo then it is fine if [domestically we first] clean 
house in order to carry out reforms [preparatory to a military campaign, 
but] if we should let the populace [of the Zhong guo] be transformed by 
the way of the Di without there being a point when it will come to an end, 
then what is it that is to be valued about humankind? Thus Yang Xiong’s 
words: “That to which the five policies are applied, what the seven taxes 
nurture, and is at the center of heaven-and-earth is the Zhong guo.” In 
Wang Tong’s words: “ The center of heaven-and-earth is nothing other 
than humankind.” For it is humankind that enlarges the Way, not the Way 
that enlarges humankind.”
25  
Ͼʕ਷ζӭ૿ϾމɓӶfՉܝู֐☠ˮf˸ζӭʘ༸横Б׵ʕ਷fю
൳ኧІی˙f˸ၾ晋ูنЬfff 
ʦʕࡡ݅ᜊ׵ζӭӶf׼ʕ਷ʘ༸fધή˸Ӌһอ̙ɰfԴ͏͛֟ᔷ
׵ӭ༸ϾೌϞʊࣛfۆОה൮׵ɛ˷f݂౮ඪʘԊ˛fʞ݁ʘה̋f
ɖረʘהቮfʕ׵˂ή٫މʕ਷fˮஷʘԊ˛f˂ήʘʕfڢ˼ɰf
ɛɰf葢ɛঐݳ༸ڢ༸ݳɛf
26 
Chen’s full answer makes clear that being “human” is to be defined in cultural rather than 
natural terms. Humankind is central to heaven-and-earth because the extension of all that 
is good depends on there being properly cultivated humans to effect it. To keep the 
separation between the Zhong guo and the Yi di is to defend the culture and thus the 
possibility of human improvement. 
In asserting that the possession of the central plain was of the essence, thus leaving 
the south spatially marginal, Chen Liang was taking a narrower spatial view than 
                                                 
24 Chen Liang ௓ڥ, Chen Liang ji ௓ڥණ, 4.48. 
25 Ibid., 4.48-9. 
26 ݳ is used to avoid the character ̾ in the name of Emperor Taizu’s father.   12 
necessary. In Northern Song some had included the south: Peng Ruli (1042-1093) wrote 
that during the Five dynasties period “the Zhong guo was divided into six or sevenʕ਷൓
މʬɖ” thus including the southern states,
27 and Wang Anshi spoke of “The Zhong guo 
having the mandate for over 100 years” ʕ਷անЇʦϵቱϋ apparently meaning the 
Song dynasty rather than the central plain per sé.
28 In Southern Song Hong Mai noted that 
in Zhou times, in contrast to his own, “The territory of the Zhong guo was extremely 
narrow,” that many named places were outside of it and that the territory included only 
several tens of modern prefectures; “it apparently was barely one fifth of all under 
heaven,”
29 which suggests that for Hong the Central Country was not fixed in space. 
When Xu Jing, a southerner, describes his account of the embassy to Kŏryŏ (Gaoli) in the 
early twelfth century as the result of “sifting out those things that were the same as the 
Zhong guo and selecting those that were different, in all over 300 items arranged in forty 
chapters”
30 ᔫΪЀͦהʿf௹ڕ衆説fᔊӖՉΝ׵ʕ਷٫Ͼ՟Չମଓfɭɧϵቱ
ૢfᔾމ̬ɤ՜, we assume that he is thinking of Great Song in cultural terms and 
equating it with the Zhong guo. Similarly, documents from Song, Liao and Jin in the 
Collection of Documents Relating to Treaties with the North During Three Reigns use 
the term Zhong guo in relation to outside states 166 times. In contrast “Great Song 
(State)” appears half as often and then in formal exchanges between states, as in “The 
Emperor of Great Song transmits this letter to His Majesty the Emperor of Great Jin”
31ɽ
҂ެ܎ߧࣣ׵ɽږެ܎ᕍɨ. Still the use of Zhong guo carries a certain spatial 
ambiguity. Does the common phrase “The Yi di have long been a problem for the Zhong 
guo”
32 ζӭމʕ਷ઃɮӶ refer to the central plain or to the state that claims to be the 
Central Country? We might ask the same on reading this call to recover the sixteen lost 
prefectures: “The Liao state will certainly perish, I hope Your Majesty will consider the 
suffering of [our] former populace and restore the past borders of the Zhong guo.”
33 ፱਷
̀ɳᗴ৮ɨׂᔚ͏ቊ෩ލʘ߮ూʕ਷ֻ׷ʘᖛ.  
More frequent is the use of the Zhong guo when Great Song is being seen as a 
political actor in relation to foreign states. When Song speakers use it the term suggests 
that the Song state is serving a historical imperative greater than itself.  
                                                 
27 Peng Ruli ుϧᘥ, “ɪࡪ ɪࡪ֚ሞ˄̻ϵϋה຅ҡᙰ” in Zhao Ruyu Ⴛϧง, Song chao zhu chen zou 
yi ҂ಃመЅ۱ᙄ (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1999), 43. I thank Jaeyoon Song for this reference. 
28 Wang Anshi ˮτͩ, Linchuan xian sheng wen ji ᑗʇ΋͛˖ණ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), 62. It 
is possible, however, that Wang had precisely the northern central plain in mind and that he was saying that 
heaven’s mandate had been lodged with the dynasty that held that space, rather than with the older Liao 
dynasty. 
29 Hong Mai ݳᒕ, Rong zhai sui bi ࢙ᓈᎇഅ, Scripta Sinica ed. (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 
1978), 5.64. Noted in Hu Axiang ߡڛୂ, Wei zai si ming : "Zhongguo" gujin chengwei yanjiu 伟۔౶Τ : 
"ʕ囯"̚ʦ称谓硏Ӻ, 262. 
30 Xu Jing ࢱྊ, Xuanhe feng shi Gaoli tu jing ܁ձւԴ৷ᘆྡ຾ Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: 
Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), Preface. I thank Jaeyoon Song for this reference.  
31 Usages counts are based on a search of the Scripta Sinica text database. Xu Mengxin ࢱྫྷ୸, San chao 
bei meng hui bian: fu jiao kan ji ɧಃ̏ຑึᇜ:ڝࣧਖা: , Scripta Sinica ed. (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 
1962), 14.97B. 
32 Ibid., preface 3A. 
33 Ibid., 1.2B.   13 
The caitiffs [i.e. the Khitans in the 16 Tang prefectures Song claimed but 
never held] know that their state will perish and that the Zhong guo will 
necessarily want its former territory. Thus they will not fight but will 
accept our guidance, saying that the Zhong guo has gotten what it wanted, 
and they still can take advantage of the Zhong guo’s power to preserve 
their lives. But if the intention of the Zhong guo is focused on necessarily 
destroying them then the caitiffs will later persuade the Jurchens to violate 
the central plain and threaten our base, all in order to have vengeance. 
This would be the worst mistake the Zhong guo could make.”
34໭ٝՉ਷
˲ɳfϾʕ਷̀૧݂ήɰf݊˸ʔ኷Ͼᛓනfፗʕ਷݅੻ה૧fϾ־
̙֠৿ʕ਷ʘැπՉА࠮Ͼʊf್ʕ਷ʘจಂ׵̀๘ʘϾܝʊf݊˸
໭ܝూႭɾॆ͕ʕࡡfහҢ͉࣬fޫ˸ూ㐾ɰfʕ਷̰ʘޟ٫fˈί
׵݊f 
When foreign speakers (in Chinese texts) use the term it seems to be no more than an 
acknowledgment that Song is at the center. As when Aguda, the Jin founder, tells a Song 
emissary, “Of what concern is the Zhong guo to me? I myself have moved into Yanshan 
[prefecture] and it is now mine. How can the Zhong guo get it? [Zhao] Liangsi was 
unable to reply.”
35 ʕ਷Оԑ༸fҢІɝዲʆfʦމҢϞfʕ਷τ੻ʘfԄෛʔঐ
࿁f Or when we read “The Jin men also sent a proclamation reading: ‘The Zhong guo 
has made a covenant [with us]. We have come to punish rebellious ministers. You should 
supply us with provisions.’”
36 ږɛɦ୅Ꮷ˛fʕ਷݅ຑӶfҢԸীۏЅf຅ჵҢ
ᔋf 
 
The Centrality of Culture and the Universality of Morality: The Zhong guo and the Yi Di 
It is generally held that Confucius already had the idea that the centrality of the Zhong 
guo was justified by its role as the source of civilizing models. The idea that Confucius 
used the Spring and Autumn Annals to make a moral-cultural distinction between the 
Zhong guo and Yi di comes from the Gongyang and Guliang commentaries, but the 
phrase that sums this up in commentaries from the middle-period on comes from Han 
Yu’s influential essay, “On the Origin of the Way” ࡡ༸. Han’s point was that Confucius 
put culture ahead of place: although some of the feudal states of Eastern Zhou were 
regarded as being Yi di and outside of the “central states,” Confucius’ approach was to 
“treat feudal lords who used Yi rituals as Yi but if they advanced to [using the rituals of] 
the zhong guo then he regarded them as zhong guo.”
37 ˆɿʘЪ݆߇ɰመڨ͜ζᓿۆζ
ʘආ׵ʕ਷ۆʕ਷ʘ. For Han the Way of the Sages had universal effectiveness—
“Thus no Way is greater than benevolence and righteousness, no teaching more correct 
then ritual and music, punishment and policy. Practice it under heaven then the myriad 
things obtain what they ought, apply it to one’s person then the body will be secure and 
the qi balanced.” ݂݊༸୽ɽ˷ʠ່f઺୽͍˷ᓿᆀΑ݁f݄ʘ׵˂ɨfຬي੻Չ
                                                 
34 Ibid., 9.60B  
35 Ibid., 16.112A. 
36 Ibid., 18.131A. 
37 Han Yu ᒵฏ and Ma Qichang ৵Չᬅ (ed.), Han Changli wen ji jiao zhu ᒵ׹ኇ˖ණࣧء (Shanghai: 
Gudian wenxue chubanshe, 1957), On the Origin of the Way. Han’s interpretation owes much to the 
Gongyang Commentary.   14 
֝fણʘ׵Չ৏f᜗τϾं̻fగ˸݊ෂʘഭfഭ˸݊ෂʘ߃f߃˸݊ෂʘಷfಷ
˸݊ෂʘ˖؛f˖؛˸݊ෂʘմʮfˆɿࣣʘ׵册fʕ਷ʘɛ˰ςʘfThe sage 
kings had transmitted it and Confucius had preserved for posterity in texts. What set the 
Zhong guo apart was that “The men of Zhong guo have maintained it through the 
generations.”
38  
For Han Yu the transmission of this Way had taken place in a certain place, but it had 
also been lost in that same place; his mission was to persuade literati to rediscover it for 
themselves. This was a matter of choice; this Culture/Way would only be effective if 
literati acted self-consciously to choose it.  
Han Yu’s “Way of the Sages” was derived from an understanding of antiquity. He 
was, ultimately, a culturalist. In contrast the Neo-Confucian moral philosophers supposed 
that the fundamental principles on which the cultural forms of a moral world were based 
were always immanent in all people, wherever they lived. As the great Neo-Confucian 
leader Zhu Xi explained: “If there is any distance [from the Way in one’s personal 
behavior] then this mind will have died. In the Zhong guo it is this principle and in the Yi 
di it is also just this same principle.”
39 ˛j༸ʔ̙඲ٷᕎd̙ᕎڢ༸g඲݊ೌ
ගᓙ˙੻g߰ϞගᓙdϤːکϥəgίʕ਷݊வၖ༸ଣdίζӭɰ̥݊வၖ༸
ଣgIt followed that just as the Yi di were capable of morality the Zhong guo was 
capable of abandoning it. Zhu tells his students: 
 “But Aguda was obstinate; he constantly spoke in terms of maintaining 
trust. Whenever his generals wanted to raise troops and charge the other 
side with crimes Aguda did not allow it, saying: ‘The treaty I have made 
with Great Song is already fixed, how can we break a treaty!’ The Yi di 
were able to maintain trust and righteousness but the fact of our breaking 
the treaty and losing trust thus caused such anger among the Yi di. Every 
time one reads his letter it pains the reader.”
40್ڛ৶͂却ԩd˼੬˸ς
ڦ່މႭgՉመਗ਼૧ሗৎжਪໆdڛ৶͂ӊʔ̙d˛jшၾɽ҂ຑ
Ⴋʊ֛d৉̙઻ຑlζӭ೓ঐςڦ່dϾшʘה˸઻ຑ̰ڦd՟ܟ
׵ζӭʘᗳνϤlӊᛘՉࣣd޶੻ɛ᎘೨. 
If fundamentally the same moral principles were endowed in all humans (including 
the Yi di of the present and past) what justified a distinction between the Zhong guo and 
the Yi di? Theoretically, from a Neo-Confucian philosophical perspective, there was no 
justification. In a passage frequently cited today Lu Jiuyuan௔ɘ଀ states: “If a sage 
should appear across the eastern or the western sea, the northern or the southern, this 
mind will be the same and this principle will be the same. Hundreds of thousands of 
generations into the past and into the future this mind will be the same and this principle 
will be the same.”
41 ؇ऎϞ໋ɛ̈ଓfϤːΝɰfϤଣΝɰfГऎϞ໋ɛ̈ଓfϤ
ːΝɰfϤଣΝɰfیऎ̏ऎϞ໋ɛ̈ଓfϤːΝɰfϤଣΝɰfɷϵ˰ʘɪϞ໋
                                                 
38 Ibid., 20, ৔ओਜ਼˖࿫ࢪҏ. 
39 Zhu Xi ϡዳ, Zhuzi yulei ϡɿႧᗳ, ed. Li Jingde ኇཨᅃ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988 ed.), 43.1106-
7. 
40 Ibid., 127.3050. 
41 Yang Jian เᔊ, Cihu yi shu ฉಳ፲ࣣ, Yingyin Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1983), 5.2b.   15 
ɛ̈ଓfϤːΝɰfϤଣΝɰfɷϵ˰ʘɨϞ໋ɛ̈ଓfϤːΝɰfϤଣΝɰ. 
Why had not the sages solved this problem once and for all when they ruled the world, 
when they “made all under heaven one family and the Zhong guo one person?”
 42 ˸˂ɨ
މɓ࢕d˸ʕ਷މɓɛ Zhu Xi’s answer is that the sages had, by transforming the 
inhabitants of the central state with culture, differentiated them, although some customs 
from those primitive undifferentiated times had survived. He explains: “In the most 
ancient times the Zhong guo and Yi di were about the same. Later when the sages came 
forth they reformed [us] but there were aspects that they did not finish, such as the 
impersonator of the dead at a sacrifice.”
43 ӁСႭdɪࣛ̚ʕ਷Шၾζӭɓছdܝ໋̈
ɛҷʘ.Ϟ͊း٫dʅՉɓɰgLu Jiuyuan had a similar explanation:  
The sages’ valuing the Zhong guo and disparaging the Yi di was not a case 
of selfishly favoring the Zhong guo. The Zhong guo obtained the qi of 
centrality and harmony and this necessarily was where ritual and 
righteousness resided. Their valuing of the Zhong guo was not valuing the 
Zhong guo it was valuing ritual and righteousness. Even when [the Zhong 
guo] went through decline and chaos, the models of the Former Kings still 
existed, their remaining customs were not completely extinguished.
44 ໋ɛ
൮ʕ਷dሩζӭdڢӷʕ਷ɰfʕ਷੻˂ήʕձʘंdոᓿ່ʘה
ίf൮ʕ਷٫dڢ൮ʕ਷ɰd൮ᓿ່ɰfᒱһস඾d΋ˮʘՊΑ೓
πdݴࠬ፲ڳd͊းؼ್ɰf 
In short it was the culture facilitated by superior geography, not inherent human 
differences, that separated the inhabitants of the two realms. It followed that the Central 
Country was the only available vehicle for defending that culture against the Yi di.  
Lu Jiuyuan’s claim had a precedent in the Comprehensive Canons of Du You, Han 
Yu’s contemporary, and Zhu Xi in the passage above was citing Du You. The section on 
foreign states in the Comprehensive Canons begins. 
Within what [heaven] covers and [earth] supports, on which the sun 
and moon shine, Hua xia occupies the center of the land, and living things 
receive qi that is correct. Its humans have a character that is harmonious 
and a capability that is generous. Its earth is most productive and its 
products multitudinous. Thus it could give birth to the sagely and worthy, 
who continued the use of law and instruction, corrected faults when they 
arose, and exploited the benefits in things. Since the Three Kings and Five 
Emperors, every generation has had men appropriate to it. Ruler and 
minister, older and younger were ranked; the teaching of the Five 
Constants and Ten Norms were complete. Filial piety and parental caring 
were born here; kindness and love became strong here. The ruler’s might 
                                                 
42 This phrase, from the Li yun chapter (9.20) of the Book of Rites, is cited in various Song commentaries 
on the Classics and, most appropriately in explications of Zhang Zai’s “Western Inscription.” See also Zhu 
Xi ϡዳ, Zhu Xi ji ϡዳණ, ed. Guo Qi ெᄁ and Yin Bo ʙت (Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 
65.536, letter to Lu Zimei. 
43 ———, Zhuzi yulei ϡɿႧᗳ, 90.2310. 
44 Lu Jiuyuan ௔ɘ଀, Xiangshan ji ൥ʆණ, Yingyin Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1983), 23.3b. “Lecture on the Great Learning.” I thank Professor Yu Yunguo ໬ථ਷for this 
reference.   16 
was proclaimed and those below were secure. Authority was not divided 
and the laws were unified. That those who lived there were greatly 
rewarded was truly due to this. 
In the past a worthy said, “After the Way is lost they turn to virtue, 
after virtue is lost they turn to benevolence, after benevolence is lost they 
turn to righteousness, after righteousness is lost they turn to ritual.”
45 
Truly he meant paring down what is thick to make it thin, diluting strong 
wine to make it weak. He also said, “Among the ancients people went to 
their deaths without ever becoming involved with one another; they did 
not exchange, they did not fight; they sought only to be self-sufficient.” 
This is a technique for dealing with the sick—praise the purity of the past 
in order to encourage them to admire it. It is common for humans to feel 
that the antiquity was better than the present; they were simpler then and 
there were few problems. Indeed it was admirable. But it was perhaps not 
free of degenerate customs and corrupt habits. Think back to the Zhong 
hua of antiquity, they were in may ways like the Yi di of today. Among 
them there is residing in nests and caves, burials without a planting of 
trees [i.e. no graveyards], eating with the hands, impersonators of the 
corpse at sacrifices; I mention but a few examples for I cannot cite them 
all. Their territories are of the extremes and their qi is obstructed. They do 
not bring into being sages and worthies; no one reforms their old customs, 
or instructs them as to what is not permitted; ritual and righteousness does 
not reach them. They are outside and not inside; they are distant and not 
close. If they come then control them; if they depart then defend against 
them. Perspicacious literati of earlier ages have already spoken of this in 
detail.
46ᔧ༱ʘʫf˚˜הᑗfശࢀ֢ɺʕf͛يաं͍fՉɛ׌ձ
Ͼʑ౉fՉήପێϾᗳᐿfה˸ሖ໋͛ሬfᘱ݄ج઺fᎇܻࣛ࿌fΪ
يл͜fɧʞ˸ࠥf˾ϞՉɛfёЅڗ̼ʘҏͭfʞ੬ɤࡐʘ઺௪f
ѽฉ͛ଓfࢸฌጙଓf˴۾ੵϾɨτfᛆʔʱϾجɓf͛ɛɽ⩚fྼ
ί׵౶fff׷ሬϞԊ˛j̰༸Ͼܝᅃf̰ᅃϾܝʠf̰ʠϾܝ່f
່̰Ͼܝᓿf༐ፗۂێމᑛf౳ቐމ⿿fɦ˛j̚٫ɛЇϼϥʔ޴
ֻԸfʔʹʔنfІӋІԑfႊ෵ࣛᆏ̷fߕֻ׷౱૮fਕ˸ዧᎸۈ
ՉᅉΣɰf್ɛʘ੬ઋfڢʦ݊̚fՉϠሯԫˇfڦո̙ߕiϾ჌ࠬ
࿌ڳfא͵Ϟʘfᇚઓ̚ʘʕശfεᗳʦʘζӭfϞ֢ஈ੫ͬଓfϞ
໣ೌ܆ዓଓfϞ˓ྠ࠮ଓfϞୄͭʅଓf୨௓ɓɚfʔঐ徧 ᑘf 
Չή਋fՉं૚fʔ໋͛ࡪf୽ࠧᔚࠬfႮ৅ʘהʔ̙fᓿ່ʘהʔ
ʿf̮ϾʔʫfଯϾʔગfԸۆጏʘf̘ۆ௪ʘfۃ˾༺ᗆʘɻ͵ʊ
Ԋʘ༉Ӷf 
Du then proceeds to summarize the history of foreign relations to show that cultural 
superiority does not equate to military superiority. Attempts to conquer the Yi di have 
                                                 
45 Dao de jing ༸ᅃ຾ 
46 Du You ӁС, Tong dian ஷՊ, 185.4978-80. The idea that the Zhong guo was in the midst of 
geographical extremes and a place where things were perfected is already found in the Xun zi; see Lewis, 
The construction of space in early China, 210.   17 
failed repeatedly, at tremendous human cost. “To hold what is full is difficult; to know 
what is enough is not easy.” ˃ܵޮոᗭ, ٝԑڢ׸. But the lesson is clear, as his own 
times have shown, foreign adventures lead to loss, not to gain. 
Du’s geographic-naturalistic explanation for cultural progress was based on the 
central plain; he roots cultural superiority in geographic space. But I think, at least in 
Southern Song, some were more willing than Chen Liang to imagine that in cultural 
terms the Central Country could exist independently of its spatial origins. The statecraft 
thinker Ye Shi quoted approvingly from the Strategies of the Warring States (኷਷ഄ):  
The Zhong guo is the place where perspicacity and intelligence abide; 
where wealth gathers; where the sages teach; where benevolence and 
righteousness are practiced; where the Odes and the Documents, ritual and 
music are employed; where genius and technique are tested; where distant 
places go to observe; where the Man and the Yi find their models.
47 ʕ਷
٫ᑋ׼ြ౽ʘה֢ɰfৌ͜ʘהၳɰf໋ɛʘה઺ɰfʠ່ʘה݄
ɰf་ࣣᓿᆀʘה͜ɰfମઽҦᖵʘה༊ɰfჃ˙ʘהᝈࠌɰfᝇζ
ʘהᄃБɰf 
From this perspective the survival of the Central Country (wherever it might be) in world 
historical terms required understanding that it held its position in the world because it 
maintained the highest standards and achievements of humanity.  
 
Central Country Rhetoric and Imperialism 
In almost the cases discussed above the speakers use the term Zhong guo when they 
want to make a distinction between their country and the Yi di other. This is not simply to 
reinforce a sense of superiority; they are making a point about the nature of the difference. 
The Central Country has its position by virtue of its culture, and it is the preservation of 
that culture that justifies maintaining the difference. But why make this argument? We 
can easily suppose that in Southern Song it was self-serving—a way of saying that we 
may have lost the north but at least we are culturally superior—and that in Northern and 
Southern Song it was a way of saying that the state-building of the northern peoples did 
not in fact make them equal to Song. But in fact in some cases the issue was not national 
self-justification but an internal debate in which a commitment to morality and culture 
was pitted against an imperialist foreign policy. This was already evident in the passage 
from Du You quoted above, and it reemerges in Northern and Southern Song. Ye Shi 
explains this in a series of essays on foreign relations. 
One maintains a country with principles, with normative names, and 
with the ability to change according to the circumstances. For the Zhong 
guo not to govern the Yi di is principle. For the Zhong guo to be the Zhong 
guo and for the Yi di to be Yi di is the normative name. We are in control 
of both. Therefore if they come to pillage then in this case we go to war 
with them; if they come to submit then in this case we receive them; to 
order them according to their reasons for coming is the ability to change 
according to the circumstances…The reason the Zhong guo is the Zhong 
guo is simply because it has these three thing. If we cast aside the tools by 
                                                 
47 Ye Shi ໢ቇ, Xi xue ji yan ୦ኪাԊ Yinyin Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1983), 18.9a. Citing Zhan guo ce (Scripta Sinica ed.) 19.656.   18 
which we will necessarily be victorious and merely rely on deceit and 
force than we will have transformed ourselves into Yi di…However, 
although the Yi di are unprincipled, they always expect good faith and 
principle from the Zhong guo. The Zhong guo regards the Yi di as 
unprincipled and thus responds to them without employing good faith and 
principle. It does not understand that this is the reason it is the Zhong guo. 
Basically it cannot abandon something because the Yi di lack it.
48  
މ਷˸່,˸Τ,˸ᛆfʕ਷ʔطζӭ,່ɰfʕ਷މʕ਷,ζӭމζӭf
Τɰfɚ٫މҢ͜f݂ՉԸ੒ɰf౶ၾʘ኷fՉԸ؂ɰf ౶ၾʘ
ટfൖՉה˸ԸϾطʘ٫fᛆɰ…ʕ਷ʘה˸މʕ਷f˸ՉϞ݊ɧ٫
Ͼʋf߼વՉה˸̀௷ʘՈfϾዹ˸ൟɢމ͜f݊݅ʋʷމζӭ
Ӷf… ್ۆζӭᒱʔ່f੬˸ڦ່ૐʕ਷fʕ਷˸ζӭމʔ່f݊
˸ʔ͜ڦ່ഈʘfʔٝϤՉה˸މʕ਷٫f͉ʔ˸ζӭʘೌϾᄻɰf 
To argue for living up to one’s own values and against imperial expansion had particular 
salience because the New Policies emperors from the 1070s into the 1120s had fought to 
expand the frontiers, resulting in the loss of the north.  
In this context to speak in terms of the Central Country as a larger national entity 
could be an alternative to “all under heaven” with its implicit claim to universal kingship. 
Lü Zuqian, contemporary and friend of Ye Shi and Chen Liang, taught one of the 
important texts from the New Policies era, Fan Zuyu’s Mirror of the Tang. I have only 
translated those comments where Lü adds emphasis to Fan’s text. 
The Central Country’s having Yi di is like day having night, yang 
having yin, and the noble man having the small man. When the Central 
Country fails in governance then the four Yi attack. We can know in 
general how the former kings controlled them. Shun said, “Reject 
schemers and the Man and Yi will lead each other in submitting.”
49 He 
also said, “Be without disrespect, be without negligence; the four Yi will 
come and recognize your kingship.”
50 In which case if you want them to 
submit nothing is better than rejecting schemers. If you wish them to come 
and recognize your kingship nothing is better than being free of disrespect 
and negligence.” “Be kind to the distant, and cultivate the ability of the 
near.”
51 They ordered the inside and gave security to the outside and 
peoples of different customs accepted their influence and admired their 
principles. They did not seduce them with profit, they did not coerce them 
with might, and they came of themselves. They aided those who wished to 
                                                 
48 Ye Shi, Ye Shi ji ໢ቇණ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1961), Bieji 4.684-6. 
49 Shun dian, Legge (Shu King, p. 42) “Be kind to the distant, and cultivate the ability of the near. Give 
honour to the virtuous, and your confidence to the good, while you discountenance the artful--so shall the 
barbarous tribes lead on one another to make their submission.” ჃݓঐᔹgખᅃʪʩgϾᗭ΂ɛgᝇζ
ଟ؂ (p 36 in the Google version of the Sacred Books of the East edition) 
50 “Da yu mo,” Lü Zuqian notes that this was an admonition to Shun, not his own words. In fact it was 
Shun to Yu. Legge (Shu King, p 47) “Be without idleness or omission, and the barbarous tribes all around 
will come and acknowledge your sovereignty.” ೌܡೌঞg̬ζԸˮ. (p 40 in the Google version of the 
Sacred Books of the East edition) 
51 Shun dian, Legge (Shu King, p 42)   19 
adhere. They did not force those who did not wish to. Therefore they did 
not exhaust the people or waste resources.  
As for rulers in later ages: some hated them and wanted to extinguish 
them, some took delight in them and wanted to get them to come. These 
two are both wrong. Why is that? Although they are Yi di they are also like 
the people of the Central Country. They pursue the beneficial and avoid 
the harmful; they desire life and dislike death. How are they different from 
people? [Lü Zuqian: That is to say, although the Yi di are not the same sort as 
the Central Country their desire for life and dislike of death are also the same as 
the people of the Central Country.] A king nurtures everything within 
heaven-and-earth. He ought even to care about the birds and beasts, the 
shrubs and trees; how much more so humans. Would he want to destroy 
them? Destroying them is certainly not allowable, how much more so 
when it is impossible to vanquish them and he ends up destroying his own 
people. This is something a humane person will not do. The one who did it 
was the First Emperor of Qin. 
Given the constraints of the landscape and the influence of the 
environment, their languages are different and their material desires are 
not the same. When [one of our rulers] takes their territory he cannot 
occupy it; when he gets their people he cannot command them. In 
organizing them into prefectures and countries he values appearances 
above reality. In addition, since he sees getting them as a meritorious 
achievement he will have to see losing them as shameful. If the loss does 
not happen under him then it will happen under his descendants. Thus 
there are the exhaustion of campaigns and the burdens of provisioning. 
The people do not survive it and he accordingly perishes. Yangdi of Sui is 
an example.  
Moreover, the territory of the Central Country is extensive, its people 
are many. Better not to take them and not to lose. Improve our ritual and 
music and administration. Nurture our people with beneficence, so that 
“farmers have surplus grain and women have surplus cloth.”
52 “Peace is 
brought about without warfare.”
53 Is this not greatly to the credit of an 
emperor or king?  
Thus to make foreign demands is as difficult as those cases and not to 
have foreign demands is as easy as this. But why then do rulers of men 
always reject what is easy and practice what is difficult? If they ignore 
what is near and prefer what is far, if they are fed up with the old and 
scheme for the new, then if they do not end up as Qin they will end up as 
Sui. Even if they do not end up perishing they will usually end up with the 
same problems. Taizong [of Tang] boasted of his achievement and ability, 
his ambitions were infinite. He wanted to make Hua and Yi, central and 
foreign, one. This was not the way to create a legacy and bring security to 
the central country. This ought to be a warning and is not to be admired. 
                                                 
52 Lü Zuqian: citing the Mencius. 
53 Lü Zuqian: citing the Yue ji   20 
[Lü Zuqian: That is to say, we ought to take Taizong as a warning; we should not 
admire what he did.]
54 
׷ʘϞ˂ɨ٫f୽ʔ˸ڿ帯̬ζމସ徳ɽุfО۔f׸繋ସ徳ɽ 
ุЇӶ۔f݂ྒྷ༊ሞʘ˛fʕ਷ʘϞζӭfνૈʘϞցfජʘϞ隂f
ёɿʘϞʃɛɰfʕ਷̰݁fۆ̬ζʹڧf΋ˮה˸੿ʘ٫f͵̙੻
Ͼ畧ၲӶfഭ˛Ͼᗭ΂ɛfᝇζଟ؂fࣣഭՊݓ逺ঐ ᔹϾᗭ΂ɛᝇζଟ
؂ ɦ˛ೌܡೌঞf̬ζԸˮfࣣɽ߃ᔪ ू˛Πҡ۔ʛʛೌܡೌঞ̬ζ
Ըˮܲ ϤуूҡഭʘᗘڢഭІԊ ್ۆ૧Չଟ؂f୽߰ᗭ΂ɛf૧ՉԸ
ˮf୽߰ೌܡঞfݓ逺ঐᔹfط内τ̮fϾࣿڳʘ͏fᓋࠬᅉ່f
ۃ܁܎ߏϵᝇ ᓋࠬఊɲᅉ່ ʔ˸лႰʔ˸۾উϾІЇӶ૧ڝ٫ۆᅨʘʔ૧٫
ʔ੶ߧɰ݂ʔ௶͏ʔ൬ৌfЇɲܝ˰ʘёfא˸讐शϾ૧ᬿ๘ʘf
אฌ悦Ͼ૧םԸʘf݊ɚ٫ޫڢɰfОۆf־ᒱζӭf͵೓ʕ਷ʘ͏
ɰfᒈлᒒ࢔f૧͛ెϥf৉Ϟମɲɛ˷fԊζӭᒱڢʕ਷ˢᗳՉ஭͛ె 
ϥ͵ၾʕ਷ʘɛΝˮ٫׵˂ήʘගೌʔቮɰf௢ᖕণ˝f೓຅爱ʘf况ɛᗳ
Ͼ૧ಞʘ˷fಞʘոʔ̙f况ʔঐ௷ϾІಞՉ͏˷fʠɛʘהʔމ
ɰfމʘ٫ॢ֐ެ݊ɰfʆʇʘהࠢfࠬंʘה୅fԊႧʔஷfෘ૧
ʔΝfাˮՓʞ˙ʘ͏ ԊႧʔஷෘ૧ʔΝ ੻Չήʔ̙֢f੻Չ͏ʔ̙
Դɰfΐމψጤf݊ਫ਼ൈΤϾաྼ ɰf˲੻ʘ݅˸މ̌fۆ̰ʘ̀
˸މ耻fՉ̰ʔίɲʉfۆίɲɿ࢑f݂Ϟּীʘ௶fᕠჵʘ๨f͏
ʔఘնϾᘱʘ˸ɳfඡ๭݊ɰf˲ʕ਷ήڢʔᄿɰf͏ڢʔ衆ɰfݏ
߰ೌ੻ೌ̰fࡌՉᓿᆀ݁ΑfাᆀাᓿᆀΑ ̬݁༺Ͼʔࣁ ˸恵ቮш
͏fԴ༵Ϟቱ഍fɾϞቱ̺f֗ᆚ˖ʮ༵Ϟ ቱ഍ɾϞቱ̺ жࠧʔ༊
˸ߧ˄̻fাᆀাжࠧʔ ༊መڨ賔؂ʔ͵܎ˮʘସߕ˷f݂ϞӋɲ
̮ν־ՉᗭɰfೌӋ׵̮νϤՉ׸ɰf್Ͼɛё੬વה׸ϾБהᗭf
О۔fׁڐϾః逺fྏ݂ϾፑอfʔɝɲॢۆɝɲඡfᒱʔЇɲɳf
Ͼ੬ၾʘΝԫfՉଢ଼徳৉୚۔f ࣣࣚ⥩ʔ ޺୚Б୞ଢ଼ɽ徳 ˄֚
޺Չ̌fঐλɽೌᇊf ۃ͉ߏᗎλɽః ̌ᇊжɲ逺 ശζʕ̮૧Չ
މɓfڢה˸፲ܝෛτʕ਷ʘ༸f፲൪ɰϤ຅˸މҡϾʔ̙ᅉɰ
Ԋ຅˸˄֚މҡ ʔ̙ᅉՉהމ 
Fan Zuyu wants to hold two positions at once: the Central Country as culture is superior 
and ought to be sought out and emulated by outsiders and there ought to be spatial 
distinction and non-interference between the Zhong guo and Yi di. In the end Ye, Fan, Lü, 
Du, and Zhu can only say that the Central Country is responsible for maintaining (its own) 
standards of morality without pressing them on others and for defending itself. Expansion 
and conquest are self-destructive. 
 
The Foreign Alternative to Central Country Discourse 
State building among the northern peoples, the breakdown of the system of foreign 
relations, and imperial adventurism led to the loss of the central plain to the Jurchens in 
1126, the retreat of the court south of the Yangzi River, and ultimately to the Mongol 
empire and its conquest of the Song in the 1270s.  
                                                 
54 Fan Zuyu ߪख़߃ and Lü Zuqian ѐख़ᑹ (annotations), Tang jian ࡥᛠ Yinyin Wenyuange Siku 
quanshu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983), 6.    21 
The Jurchens, after their conquest of the northern part of Song, were undecided about 
whether they would be an external state that had taken possession of the central plain or 
whether they were going to recast themselves as the latest incarnation of the Central 
Country. After the attempt to conquer the south failed Emperor Shizong supported a 
retrenchment. Yet his administration tried both to maintain its otherness, through a 
program to maintain the Jurchen customs of the northeast for example, and to claim the 
same ethical values of the Central Country’s antiquity and a commitment to civil culture 
by reviving the examination system for both literati of the north and for Jurchens (using 
the new Jurchen script).
55 Texts in Chinese that quote Jurchen leaders occasionally do use 
the term the Zhong guo, but it is not immediately clear when a speaker is making a 
reference to the space of the ancient central states or has in mind a spatiocultural claim to 
being the Central Country.
56 Thus the objection that tea was a “weed from Song soil” for 
which the “valuable silk textiles of the Zhong guo” should not be traded could merely 
refer to the central plain.
57 ɞϋɖ˜dԊԫ٫˸঩ɗ҂ɺণٽdϾ׸ʕ਷കၧᎀ຿Ϟ
ूʘيdʔ̙ɰgA similar ambiguity crops up when, reflecting on the rise of the 
Mongols that placed Jin in the middle between enemies, the Jin emperor tells his generals: 
“The reason the northern troops are always victorious is because they rely on northern 
horse power against the technology of the Zhong guo. It is indeed difficult for us to match 
them, but as for the Song people, they are hardly a concern. With three thousand troops I 
could easily move about between the Yangzi and Huai Rivers; you should try harder.”
58 
ɪፙʘ˛j̏жה˸੬՟Ό௷٫dܪ̏˙ʘ৵ɢdఱʕ਷ʘҦ̷ЀgҢྼᗭၾʘ
ᅮdЇ׵҂ɛdОԑ༸۔gࣥ੻͠ɻɧɷdᐽዑϪeଊගϞቱɢӶgࡠഃۈʘg
But at least in one instance a Jurchen leader, in the course of agreeing with a chief 
councilor’s comment that “Song has long been a defeated state, it will certainly not dare 
move against us,” appears to grant the Song view of itself: “Although Song is the Zhong 
guo, its power is inadequate [to threaten us].”
59 ̸ͮ޴֚ख˛j҂ɮ઻ʘ਷d̀ʔ
౲ਗg[ዹΛ]ܠ׀˛j҂ᒱʕ਷dШɢʔԑЀgPerhaps because they were 
never as successful in conquest, the Jurchen court’s leaders differ from the Manchus in 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in two respects. First, the Jurchens do not 
assert, as Qing emperors (but not literati) did, that the Zhong guo was coterminous with 
their territory, thus making the various frontier peoples that earlier times had called Yi di 
now the “the populace of the Zhong guo” ʕ਷ʘ͏. Second, the Jurchens do not make a 
point of recognizing the Zhong guo as transdynastic cultural entity representing civilized 
life. The Manchus’ acceptance of that proposition explains their desire to expand the 
space of the Zhong guo, thus allowing them to be integral to it, in a manner that fits the 
twentieth century better than the middle period.
60 
                                                 
55 Peter K. Bol, "Seeking Common Ground: Han Literati Under Jurchen Rule," Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies 47, no. 2 (1987). 
56 In addition to the examples cited below, see Tuotuo ୭୭, ed., Jin shi ږ̦, Scripta Sinica ed. (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1975), 63.1506, 93.2078, 98.167, 175, 180. 
57 Ibid., 49.1109. 
58 Ibid., 119.2599. 
59 Ibid., 93.2064. 
60 This view of the Qing imperial use of the Zhong guo, which contrasts with the conclusions drawn in 
some recent scholarship, is from Gang Zhao, "Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of   22 
 What the Jurchens did contribute was a rather different and, from the documentary 
evidence, a far more common approach, one that the Mongols’ Great Yuan adopted and 
extended. This was the legal recognition of ethnopolitical distinctions among the various 
peoples they had conquered. For the Mongols these were more important than the 
cultural-political distinctions between officials, literati, and registered population (min) 
and obviated the need to take recourse to terms like the Zhong guo. An example is a 
ruling in 1264 that “Meng-gu-ren will fill the post of overseer (darughaci) of each route, 
Han-ren will fill the post of commander, Hui-hui will fill the post of co-administrator. 
This is to be the system forever.” ˸ႆ̚ɛ̂΢༩༺ኁڀԏ, ဏɛ̂ᐼ၍, ΫΫɛ̂Ν
ٝ, ͑މ֛Փ.
61 And five years later: “Nü-zhen, Qi-dan, and Han-ren serving as 
overseers (darughaci) of all routes are to be removed. Hui-hui, Wei-wu, Nai-man, and 
Tang-wu are to continue as before.” ᇦመ༩ɾٜe۰ʗeဏɛމ༺ኁڀԏ٫, ΫΫe
ޡɴeɗᝇeࡥɴɛʥᔚ.
62 
The use of Han-ren to refer to the native inhabitants of the conquered territory began 
with the medieval northern conquest dynasties and was common currency by Song times. 
It was an ethnocultural distinction—as in “their clothing and speech is generally like that 
of Han-ren” ဏɛ
63—but, I see not evidence that it was used in this period as an 
ideological foundation for state building. In Song the term comes up in the context of 
frontier populations, when a distinction is made between our kind of people and the 
distinctive others on the frontier (the Fan-ren ጻɛ). Thus, for example, in the context of 
an effort to expand the frontiers, which led to the incorporation of foreign populations, 
Wang Anshi proposes that “If today the 300,000 Han-ren can exchange goods for land 
and the Fan-ren get goods, then both sides will get what they want. The fields will be 
cultivated and goods will flow. Fan and Han will be one; the situation will be easy to 
manage.”
64 τͩ۱˛jʦ˸ɧɤຬʘဏɛ੻˸஬ၾጻ௅׸͞fጻɛ੻஬fՇ੻ה
૧fϾ͞ᖚኤf஬ಟஷfጻဏމɓfՉැ׸˸ሜ੿. But an opponent argued against 
integration, demanding that intermarriage be forbidden.
65 
In Liao, Jin, and Yuan sources there are frequent references to ethnocultural groups, as 
when a Jin edict orders that “When officials draft announcements, the Jurchens, Khitans, 
and Han people are each to use their own writing systems.” ൝ϵ֜Ⴎն, ɾٜe۰ʗeဏ
ɛ΢͉͜ο.
66 Perhaps because they had many more groups to deal with and maintained 
their rule by working with the different population groups that had submitted, the Yuan 
relied heavily on quotas in apportioning office and giving access to resources; quotas 
subordinated those they had conquered but also guaranteed a degree of participation and 
representation.
67 Court policy sometimes distinguished between different groups, as we 
have seen above, but sometimes it lumped groups into larger categories, in which the 
                                                                                                                                                
Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early twentieth Century," Modern China 32, no. 1 (2006): 7-14. I 
thank Mark Elliott, who has reached much the same conclusion, for referring me to this article. 
61 Song Lian ҂ዟ, ed., Yuan shi  ʩ̦ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1976), 6.106. 
62 Ibid., 6.118. 
63 Tuotuo ୭୭, ed., Song shi ҂̦, 251.14152. 
64 Ibid., 144.4759. 
65 This was Liu Xiang ᄎܒ (1023-1086), see Ibid., 322.10452.  
66 Jin shi ږ̦ 4.73. 
67 E.g. Song Lian ҂ዟ, ed., Yuan shi ʩ̦, 349, 410, 28, 541, 712, 86.   23 
order of precedence corresponded to the sequence of conquest or submission: the Meng-
gu (the various tribes of Mongolia), se-mu (literally “the many kinds,” referring to the 
various Central Asian peoples), Han-ren (the Khitan, Jurchen, and Han-ren population of 
Jin), and Nan-ren (the people of Southern Song).
68 In one case we find a larger 
distinction between the various Central Asian peoples, who are to be given the same 
privileges as Meng-gu-ren, and the “Nü-zhen and Qi-dan, who are [to be treated] the 
same as Han-ren. If the Nü-zhen and Qi-dan are from the northwest and do not 
comprehend Han language they are [to be treated] the same as Meng-gu-ren. Nü-zhen 
who have lived a long time in Han areas are [to be treated] the same as Han-ren.”
69˸ئ
ГeΫΫeޡшՅഃԱ΢֜ۜ̂ຬ˒ִ༺ኁڀԏdΝႆ̚ɛiɾٜe۰ʗdΝဏ
ɛg߰ɾٜe۰ʗ͛Г̏ʔஷဏႧ٫dΝႆ̚ɛiɾٜ͛ڗဏήdΝဏɛgThere 
seems to have been a general assumption that it was obvious who was who, but some did 
try to cross boundaries, thus necessitating the ruling that “For overseers of the prefectures 
and counties apportioned to the princes and consorts of princesses only Meng-gu-ren are 
to be used and by rule shifted every three years. Those Han-ren, Nü-zhen, and Qi-dan 
whose names are Meng-gu are to be removed.
70 ൝jመˮeቹ৵הʱয়ԛd༺ኁڀ
ԏઓ͜ႆ̚ɛdɧϋԱԷቋ˾dՉဏɛeɾٜe۰ʗΤމႆ̚٫ޫᇦʘgAt one 
point, presumably to prevent boundary crossing into higher offices that required literacy 
it was ordered that “Han-ren and Nan-ren are forbidden to learn Meng-gu and Se-mu 
writing.”
71 
From an imperial perspective one advantage of speaking in terms of ethnopolitical 
groups was that it avoided suggesting that “the Central Country” and certain population 
groups had a privileged cultural authority. But this was what literati wanted, as when the 
northern scholar and Neo-Confucian advocate Xu Heng spoke of it taking thirty years to 
“change the customs of the north to using the methods of the Central Country. When the 
Jin State first perished we should have proposed this and it is a great pity that we did not 
attend to it.”
72 ˸̏˙ʘڳdҷ͜ʕ਷ʘجɰdڢɧɤϋʔ̙ϓ̌fί׷ږ਷ڋɳd
ک຅ᙄϤdϤϾʔਕd༐މ̙઎. The same approach is evident when a memorialist 
urges the founding of an ancestral temple on the grounds that “Your Majesty is now 
emperor over the Central Country, you ought to practice the affairs of the Central 
Country.”
73 ৮ɨ܎ʕ਷d຅Бʕ਷ԫfԫʘɽ٫d࠯ઓୄ٠dୄ٠̀Ϟ૶ᄽf
But another proponent of the reinstatement of sacrifices to the imperial ancestors forsook 
the appeal to the Zhong guo and argued successfully from precedent: this is what those 
who held all under heaven, who in the past were Han-ren (but now were not), did.
74 ׵݊
ʕࣣ޲Ѕ۱˛jІ̚ဏɛϞ˂ɨdՉख़֚ޫৣ˂ԮୄdЅഃၾ̻௝О࿲ख़ᙄd֚
                                                 
68 The quotas for the civil service examination is a particularly clear case. Ibid., 81.2019-21. I have found 
one instance of in which the southerners are referred to as “men of Song,” see Yuan shi  ʩ̦, 349. 
69 Song Lian ҂ዟ, ed., Yuan shi  ʩ̦, 268. 
70 Ibid., 458. 
71 Ibid., 39.839. 
72 Chen Dezhi ௓੻ٺ, Qiu Shusen ړዓಌ, and He Zhaoji ОΊΛ, eds., Yuan dai zou yi ji lu ʩ˾۱ᙄණ
፽, Scripta Sinica ed., Yuan dai shi liao cong kan (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1998), A.90. 
73 Su Tianjue ᘽ˂ᐌ, Yuan chao ming chen shi lue ʩಃΤЅԫଫ Scripta Sinica ed. (Beijing: Zhonghua 
shuju, 1962), 12.252. 
74 Song Lian ҂ዟ, ed., Yuan shi  ʩ̦, 72.1783-4.   24 
ᄽʊԱࣛୄԮdʦࠚ٠˟ୄ˂gՓ˛̙g๋݊یࠚdৣЗ༹޲gSimilarly, 
the heir apparent could be ordered to “learn the writing of Han-ren” without allowing an 
implication of centrality, it was just a valuable attribute of one more group of subjects.
75 
In the memorials and public essays we have those who did deploy the concept of the 
Zhong guo used it to argue that Great Yuan ought to define the state in terms of the 
Zhong guo as a transdynastic spatiocultural entity and against policies that used its 
resources to further expand Great Yuan to areas outside of it. The fact that “Imperial 
Yuan had integrated all under heaven,” ެʩ૿ɓ˂ɨincluding both the Zhong guo and 
the foreign was rarely celebrated.
76 Instead we find opposition to expeditions against the 
southwest, Japan, and the Turks, based in each case on the adequacy of the Zhong guo for 
a state and the harm expansion would do to its inhabitants.
77 
 
Great Ming and the Central Country 
We may read the pronouncements of Zhu Yuanzhang, the founder of Ming (1368-
1644) who rose in the south and drove the Mongols from the central plain, in this context. 
The Great Ming State went on to fight wars against the Mongols, Vietnamese, and the 
Japanese in Korea and (after trying to close foreign trade for a century) traded with East 
and Southeast Asia, India, Arabia, Africa, Europe, and the New World.  
The Ming founder attempted to sort out the conundrum created by the fact that despite 
the ancient distinction between the Zhong guo and the Yi di, for the past century the Yi 
had also been emperors. After Song, he explained, heaven’s mandate to rule had gone to 
an extraordinary man from the desert, who “entered the Central Country and became 
master of all under heaven,” but now he as a man from the southeast had become “the 
ruler of the Central Country.”
78 But in letters to the rulers of foreign states he challenges 
the legitimacy of the Yuan on cultural grounds. “In the past our Zhong guo Ңʕ਷ was 
unjustly occupied by the nomads for 100 years, and they then had the Yi di spread across 
the four quarters, abolishing our Zhong guo’s moral norms…I am now ruler of the Zhong 
guo and all under heaven are at peace. I fear that the Four Yi do not yet know of this, 
therefore I am sending ambassadors to report to all countries.”
79 ᙵ٫Ңʕ਷މߡɛ᛿ኽ
ϵϋf༹Դζӭ̺တ̬˙fᄻҢʕ਷ʘᓏࡐfffࣥ˴ʕ਷f˂ɨ˙τfࢵ̬ζ͊
                                                 
75 Ibid., 886. 
76 Liu Yueshen ᄎ֪͡, Shenzhai ji ͡ᓈණ, Yinyin Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1983). ؇ڛጤზ۬ᕄ˃ɿᄽ຦ andࣣ੢ʆ຦ܝ. Xiao Ju ጽ￿ Qin zhai ji ාᓈණ Yingyin 
Wenyuange Siku quanshu (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983). Introduction to the collection by 
Zhang Chong ੵә. Ouyang Xuan ᆄජ͖, Guizhai wen ji ΰᓈ˖ණ Yinyin Wenyuange Siku quanshu 
(Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1983). ʩ݂۲௝ტԲࣣኪɻጫ؍Բᑺኪɻஷւɽ˃໬འʮग़༸
຦ (for Yu Ji). I agree with the Tsutsumi that “united north and south” ૿ɓی̏was aimed at the native 
audience rather than expressing the Mongols’ view, however it seems to me that this usage refers not to 
north and south of the Great Wall but the south and the central plain of the north; see Tsustumi Kazuaki చ
ɓ݇, "Chūgoku no jigazō -- sono jikan to kūkan o kitei suru monoʕ਷㗮І೥྅--㗝㗮ࣛග㗨٤ග㘒஝
֛㗙㘋㘂㗮," 43-44. 
77 Su Tianjue ᘽ˂ᐌ, Yuan chao ming chen shi lue ʩಃΤЅԫଫ 4.58, Chen Dezhi ௓੻ٺ, Qiu Shusen 
ړዓಌ, and He Zhaoji ОΊΛ, eds., Yuan dai zou yi ji lu ʩ˾۱ᙄණ፽, A.321, B.262. 
78 From his announcement on taking the throne, in Qian Bocheng ፺Ь۬ and et al., eds., Quan Ming wen 
Ό׼˖ (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 1992), 1.2. 
79 Ibid., 18.339  to the King of Zhan-cheng.   25 
ٝf݂჆Դ˸జመ਷fI am, he informs the King of Japan, “originally of an old family 
of the Zhong guo ͉ࣥʕ਷ʘᔚ࢕…” “Since last year I have cut off the northern Yi and 
ruled the Zhong guo, but I have not yet reported to the four Yi.” І๋̘˸Ը,  ᬿഒ̏ζ, ˸
˴ʕ਷, ઓ̬ζ͊జ.
80 Earlier, in announcing his intent to the north to take the central 
plain, he had appealed also to culture and history: “Since antiquity when emperors and 
kings directed all under heaven, the Zhong guo occupied the inside and regulated the Yi di, 
and the Yi di occupied the outside and served the Zhong guo. I have never heard of the Yi 
governing all under heaven. Once the Song gift was transferred, the Yuan as northern Yi 
entered and ruled the Zhong guo, all inside and outside the four seas submitted as subjects. 
How could this be due to human strength? In fact it was heaven that gave it. But excellent 
men and committed literati still were saddened by the overturning of official garb. From 
that time forth the minister and sons of Yuan did not honor the ancestral instructions, they 
destroyed the norms.”
81 І̚܎ˮᑗ੿˂ɨfʕ਷֢内˸Փζӭfζӭ֢̮˸ւʕ
਷f͊ၲ˸ζӭط ˂ɨɰfІ҂ढ़倾୅fʩ˸̏ӭɝ˴ʕ਷f̬ऎ内̮f٨ʔЅ
؂fϤ৉ɛɢfྼɗ˂બf್༺ɛқɻf֠ϞڿᄵࡀໄʘྖfІ݊˸ܝfʩʘЅɿ
ʔ፭ख़৅fڢᕸၣ੬f 
From the perspective of place, the legitimacy of a dynasty in the “legitimate 
succession of the Zhong guo”
82 ʕ਷͍୕was vouchsafed by its possession of the 
territory. But in speaking the language of the Zhong guo the Ming founder does not 
appeal to place or the right of the Han-ren and Nan-ren as inhabitants to rule. Rather, he 
puts culture over place: it is the nomads’ disregard for the civilization that had ancient 
roots in the Zhong guo that ultimately made their possession unjust even if Heaven had 
originally given them the mandate to rule. This civilization—the way people lived, their 
sense of morality, the cultural forms they employed— ought to dominate the Zhong guo 
and existed distinct from the organization of political power. When he speaks of “my/our 
Zhong guo” Zhu claims to be committed to it, and it is this that justifies driving out the 
northern Yi and establishing his own political power. In adopting this language and 
making his connection to the Zhong guo the primary issue in writing to foreign rulers (he 
mentions that his state name is Great Ming in passing) the Ming founder was joining 
those literati from north and south who had distinguished a culture with a history from 
political authority and thus made southerners equally claimants to the right to define it.
83 
Yet he was not immune to the language of population groups, as when he informs the 
state of Dali that “Over seven years I have restored our Han people’s old country and 
united the Central Xia. All the states of the four Yi have been informed, and they all have 
announced themselves as subjects and come with tribute.”
84ూҢဏɛ݂਷୕ɓʕࢀʦ຾
ɖϋf̬ζመ਷ʊஷజf ೌʔ၈Ѕɝ্f 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 18.339. 
81ፙʕࡡᏧ in the Huang Ming wenhengެ׼˖ፅ (Sibu congkan); see the discussion in Mittag, "The Early 
Modern Formation of a National Identity in Chinese Historical Thought—Random Notes on Ming and 
Early-Qing Historiography". 
82 Qian Bocheng ፺Ь۬ and al., eds., Quan Ming wen Ό׼˖, 18.339, to the King of Gua-ai. 
83 John W. Dardess, "Did the Mongols Matter? Territory, Power, and the Intelligentsia from the Northern 
Song to the Early Ming," in The Song-Yuan-Ming Transition in Chinese History, ed. Paul Smith and 
Richard von Glahn (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003).  
84 Qian Bocheng ፺Ь۬ and al., eds., Quan Ming wen Ό׼˖, vol. 1, p. 18.   26 
The founder, although not free of imperial designs (the reconquest of Yunnan being 
an example), defined the limits on Ming expansion, and thus accepted what his use of the 
Zhong guo implied, that the Central Country would be surrounded by foreign states on all 
sides. His successors were less restrained in their exercise of imperial power abroad, but 
when in 1449 the emperor was captured on an expedition against the Mongols north of 
the Great Wall, the issue of the Central Country’s relations with the countries of the Yi di 
came once again to the fore. When in 1487 Qiu Jun ˳औpresented to the throne his 
monumental study of statecraft, the Supplement to the Elaboration of Meaning of the 
Great Learning ɽኪࠃ່໾, he drew at length on Song literati writings and the 
founder’s views in arguing for necessity of keeping the Zhong guo and foreign states 
separate rather than trying to include them in an effort to “make all under heaven one 
family.”
85 Qiu spoke not of Great Ming but of the Zhong guo, with origins in antiquity, 
quoting Zhu Xi: “The Hua xia is the land of the Central Country civilizationʕ਷˖׼ʘ
ή.”
86 The Ming founder stands out for forcing out the only foreigners to occupy all of 
the Zhong guo, and recovering the sixteen prefectures that had been lost for 448 years, 
and the central plain that had been lost for 241 years. The Mongols were illegitimate 
rulers because they did not honor the cultural tradition of ancient Zhou, and led “our 
people of the Zhong guo” to forsake it themselves. There is no “great virtue” in trying to 
attract the Yi di to submit, virtue is culturally specific, it applies to “the land of the Hua 
xia civilization.”
87 This does not mean that foreign relations should be cut off. Instead 
they should be intensively managed and supervised. The Ming founder’s view of the 
world extended into the Pacific Ocean and across Eurasia to the Atlantic, as we know 
from a giant map (386 cm. x 486 cm) from 1389.
88 Throughout Qiu makes the point that 
domestic well-being is the foundation of national security, the central concern of the 
Central Country is itself and its civilization.
89  
But consistently Qiu Jun argues in terms of population groups and calls for their 
separation: heaven-and-earth have created a boundary, inside are the Hua, outside are the 
Yi. Those foreigners who have settled within this boundary must be managed, broken into 
smaller groups and relocated, so that they disappear as distinct peoples.
90 Perhaps for the 
first time we have the idea that the Central Country belongs to a certain group of people 
as much as it does to a culture.  
 
Conclusions 
The modern use of Zhongguo/China is different from the middle period use of the 
Zhong guo/the Central Country. Both are place names (although the place varied over 
time) but only the second is also an ideological term that defines the cultural position of 
the country in relation to the outside world. I do not think this is at odds with what we 
already know.  
                                                 
85 Qiu Jun ˳औ, Da xue yan yi bu ɽ学ࠃ义补, ed. Zhou Jifu մ济˃ (Beijing Shi ̏ԯ̹: Jing hua 
chubanshe ԯ华̈وٟ, 1999), Chapters 143-56 “Controlling the Yi di”.  
86 Ibid., 143.1236. I have not located the passage in Zhu Xi’s works. 
87 Ibid., 144.1246-9. 
88 Cao Wanru ૎ੈν and al., eds., Zhongguo gudai ditu ji ʕ਷̚˾ήྡණ, II.pls. 1-5. 
89 Qiu Jun ˳औ, Da xue yan yi bu ɽ学ࠃ义补, 145.1257-61. 
90 Ibid., 143.1237-40.   27 
  Worth remarking upon are two other findings. First, those who employed Zhong 
guo/the Central Country discourse were in fact proponents of a permanent distinction 
between themselves and the foreign others in cultural terms (but not necessarily ethnic 
terms). This precluded the possibility of equality. They also opposed an expansionist 
foreign policy because they denied that historically different cultures could be 
harmoniously absorbed into a single polity. Such a position did lead to an acceptance of 
foreign states, but not to engaging them as partners in any kind of international mission. 
Doing good was only possible within a domestic context. In this view the relationship 
with foreign states was fundamentally defensive, and although it did not preclude 
foreigners coming to acquire cultural and material goods the relationship was one-sided. 
Assimilation was permitted in theory, although in Qiu Jun’s view true assimilation of a 
population that was the majority in its own enclave was close to impossible.  
  Second, another possibility emerged during the middle period. The Jurchens and 
particularly the Mongols had some success in formally recognizing different population 
groups as members of a single polity through a quota system. This had the advantage of 
ensuring a degree of representation to the conquered peoples while writing the privileges 
of the conquerors into law. This was a system that allowed for the expansion of empire; it 
was not constrained by culture or place and thus there was no need for cultural 
assimilation. In fact assimilation was seen as undermining what was in effect a spoils 
system aimed at privileging the dominant minority population.  
It seems to me that these two possibilities do not entirely fit a Chinese/foreign 
dichotomy. It is true that the proponents of Central Country culture were literati who saw 
themselves as being the bearers of that culture and who saw cultural learning (and 
examinations) as a criterion according to which political power should be distributed. But 
they found allies among highly placed Khitans, Jurchens, Central Asians, and Mongols. 
Although proponents of quota systems were foreign conquest groups they found 
supporters among the inhabitants of northern and southern China who were, after all, 
guaranteed a share. Yet the introduction of ethnopolitical distinctions as a crucial factor 
in public life had influence that in Ming could link a people with a polity, the very 
opposite of what foreign conquerors had tried to achieve.    28 
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